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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EDWARD S. ROBINSON
THURMAN W. ARNOLDt
THE PAGES of a law journal are ill adapted to express the sense of bit-
ter tragedy and irreparable personal loss which all of us at Yale feel
in the loss of our friend and colleague, Edward S. Robinson. I will
not try it.
I prefer as a final tribute to him to attempt to put on paper a glimpse
of that brilliant, restless, pioneering mind, unusual in any generation
of scholars. Professor Robinson viewed the entire world of social insti-
tutions from the angle given him by his long training in observing
what most of us call the "human mind." He refused to accept the tra-
ditional learning or the traditional limitations of any subject. He avoided
the sedate security of what scholars call a "field." When his observa-
tion told him that the "law" must necessarily be a very simple and
somewhat primitive technique, he had the courage to act on that assump-
tion and write down his observations on law and lawyers.
Many lawyers thought him a trespasser upon their exclusive territory,
and many psychologists considered him a wanderer from the established
limitations marked out by the constitutional fathers of that subject. A
certain hostility of this kind was inevitable. Broad points of view are not
congenial to the attitude which has departmentalized our institutions of
learning. The queer country of scholarship has been mapped out in little
irregular patches of domain, staked out and appropriated by different
groups with names derived from Latin and Greek sources. It is all
right for the neighbors to get together now and then for a housewarm-
ing or for a cooperative effort in which the resources of their respective
principalities are joined for the common good. But when one man crosses
to his neighbor's domain to make maps and sketches of the fortifications,
as if lie contemplated changing the boundaries, he is greeted with sus-
picion and alarm. Scholarship has its own capitalistic system and thous-
ands of earnest and industrious men are dependent on it for both prestige
and income. They do not want their separate properties taken away
without due process. They have spent endless effort building books and
articles on these properties. The separation of powers between lawyers,
economists and psychologists is the most important concept in the federa-
tion of independent intellectual sovereignties known as a University.
Even inside these independent sovereignties, enterprise is far from
communistic. The law has its own little fields, within its larger field.
Deans of law schools, when a "property man" resigns, seek to replace
him with another "property man," and will not hear of hiring a "con-
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flicts man" to take his place. Economics and psychology, and all the
rest of the scholarly states, are divided along the same lines, and the
rolling stone which rolls over these lines is permitted to gather a mini-
mum of moss. Professor Robinson was a born trespasser and a con-
genital rolling stone.
Of course, these scholars knew that the tumbling stream of events
was not divided this way, and so great defenses were erected to keep
these events from bothering their pious meditations. Actual events were
supposed to take place in a temporal world. The scholar lived in the
spiritual world of principle and formula. Political scholars were advised
not to mingle in politics; trial lawyers were avoided in law schools; and
advertising men were looked at with suspicion in faculties devoted to
the study of the psychology of men in groups. When a real scholar
wanted to visit the temporal world of events, he protected himself from
its vanities by a set of armor called "statistical method." This narrowed
his field of vision so much that he could not see enough at any one time
to be contaminated.
A psychologist could enter the field of law and cooperate with jurists,
provided that he took the word of sufficiently respectable legal scholars
as to what the law was. If he made his own observations, he was treated
with the same scorn that an anthropologist, describing savage customs,
would have received from the priests of the tribe he was observing.
And so it was that Professor Robinson's observations made some people
very angry indeed. Such criticism never disturbed him. He recognized
too well the paradox that if lawyers did not get a little angry with what
he said about the law, then what he said about the law could not be true.
This is not a real paradox. It is merely another way of saying that per-
sons engaged in a highly complicated ceremonial, filled with all sorts of
symbolism in which they believe salvation is to be found, are always
disturbed by practical observations about the ceremonial. If they were
not so disturbed, it would mean only that they did not really believe in
the ceremony.
The extent of the contribution which Professor Robinson was about
to make went far beyond his book, Law and the Lawyers,' written at an
early stage in his development. In the seminar which he was conducting
with me, he was developing ideas which have appeared nowhere in his
printed work. He was beginning a technique for the organized study
of men in groups that was already giving him new insight into activities
of social institutions. That technique was still unformed. Yet it gave
him a platform on which to observe the habits of men both in law and
in politics, to diagnose social conflicts and to predict the results. I will
illustrate by giving two of his diagnoses made from that platform, selected
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because they relate to familiar events and thus give a hint as to his method
of thinking.
Late in 1932 I attended a conference of bankers, economists and
lawyers assembled by a gentleman of some prominence in the banking
world, who then foresaw the impending collapse of our banking system
which finally took place in March. It was conducted in an atmosphere
of intense gloom because everyone was convinced of two things: that
a collapse of the banking structure was imminent, and that some drastic
preventive measures were needed. On the question of the particular
measures needed no two men of the group agreed. Everyone saw
dangers in everyone else's plans. The meeting ended in complete dis-
agreement- as all meetings ended in those troubled times, no matter
who attended them. Everyone, however, agreed with the statement of a
prominent lawyer, who said: "My mind fails to function when I think
of the extent of the catastrophe that will follow when the Chase National
Bank closes its doors."
I returned to New Haven much depressed and saw Professor Robin-
son, who unaccountably remained quite cheerful about the whole sit-
uation. I said: "But you don't seem to realize that there is a crash
coming." He replied: "Did any of these experts specify in. any concrete
terms what human beings would do when the crash occurred?" I
admitted that they had not done so. He asked: "Do you think that when
the banks all close people will climb trees and throw cocoanuts at each
other?" I admitted that this was a little unlikely, but that a bank crash
of this magnitude certainly sounded like rioting and perhaps like revo-
lution. Professor Robinson replied: "I will venture a prediction as to
exactly what will happen. When the banks close, everyone will feel
relieved. It will be a sort of national holiday. There will be general
excitement and a feeling of great interest. Travel will not stop; hotels
will not close; everyone will have a lot of fun, although they will not
admit that it's fun at the time."
Months afterwards I happened to be in New York on the day that
all the banks did close. I was amazed at the accuracy of Professor
Robinson's diagnosis. I had very little cash, but was able to give checks
at hotels for food and lodging without any difficulty. Everyone was
excited and interested. They had something to think about and talk
about. It was a great emotional release. Space does not permit me to
go into the reasons Professor Robinson gave for this guess. It was,
however, of all the predictions which I heard about the impending crash,
the only one that was accurate.
I will give another illustration. Nearly a year before the last election
Professor Robinson was commenting upon the press campaign against
President Roosevelt, which was just getting under way. He said: "These
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anti-Roosevelt editors are all wrong. They completely misunderstand the
effect of what they are saying and doing. Newspapers are a powerful
influence in this country. They will continue to be a powerful influence.
However, the people who write the editorials and columns do not under-
stand very well the nature of that influence in our peculiar intellectual
atmosphere. They are now calling Roosevelt every possible name. Start-
ing out with violent language, they will necessarily use language more
and more violent. They cannot help themselves any more than the movie
advertisers can help themselves when they make it impossible to describe
a really good picture because the words 'colossal' and 'stupendous' have
been used so frequently to describe inferior pictures that they have no
meaning when applied to good ones. As the campaign goes on, attacks
from newspapers will become more and more meaningless. Men caught
in this type of psychology simply cannot stop. It isn't anybody's fault;
it's just something that is going to happen.
"Now all this is going to make Roosevelt a popular hero. Take an il-
lustration from dramatic techniques. The ordinary melodrama exposes
the villain in the last act. The hero denounces him; the heroine points
the finger of scorn at him and everyone goes away thoroughly disgusted
with his conduct. But this exposure must take place at the end of the
play. If it took place at the beginning of the play and kept up through-
out the production, you would find that the villain was assuming heroic
proportions and that the hero was becoming somewhat namby-pamby.
The same thing will happen in this campaign, because editors do not
realize that a political campaign is a dramatic production. Their tech-
nical propagandists think it is something like advertising tooth paste,
in which a slogan becomes impressed on the public mind by constant
reiteration until everyone buys the tooth paste. In fact, it is entirely
different. The denunciation of Roosevelt is laying the ground for a
triumphal march by him at the end of the play. This doesn't mean that
the press is losing its influence. It means only that the influence of the
press on public opinion is not very well understood by the people who
own the newspapers. Newspaper men are beginning to learn how an
advertising campaign sells soap. They do not yet understand how to
bring a political drama to a climax. That is a difficult technique, like
producing a play. It may fail even in skilled hands. However, it is
bound to fail in the hands of people who think that dramas can be suc-
cessful with high pressure salesmen on the stage instead of actors. The
press campaign is going to get results, but not the results the editors
expect."
The accuracy of this prediction as to the results of the newspaper
campaign was verified in a most startling way and yet people still do
not understand it. They are still talking today about the "waning in-
fluence of the press."
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And what has the ability to make such predictions to do with law?
Professor Robinson thought it had a very great relevance. Legal argu-
ments, he thought, were the same type of propaganda as political debates,
except that they were couched in more solemn and more ceremonial
terms. In some primitive tribes when a dispute occurs a line is drawn
on the sand and the parties hire medicine-men to help them make faces
at each other. They finally get tired and the case is ended without
violence. In more sophisticated primitive civilizations they use proverbs.
Where outside prejudices are not aroused the best proverb always wins.
In our common law system today parables are used rather than proverbs,
which allow more play for the ingenious mind and make it a more com-
plicated game, just as bridge is more complicated than matching pennies.
Professor Robinson saw all this as a fascinating study in modern
anthropology. He never condemned it or thought that he saw a sub-
stitute for it. He was simply an observer.
It was this quality that made so many people misunderstand his atti-
tude. To call law a game seems sacrilegious. In the rational atmos-
phere of our law schools, we instinctively suppose there is only one
true approach to law. We quarrel about what that approach is and
split into realist and fundamentalist schools. The difference between
these two groups cannot be defined. It can be said only that the one
attitude toward legal precepts is more reverent than the other. Never-
theless, an intellectual struggle goes on and everyone searches for some
universal truth about what the law is.
Professor Robinson saw jurisprudence not from the point of view
of an umpire deciding which jurists were right, but from the point of
view of a psychologist studying a group which was undergoing
spiritual conflict between ideals and practical needs, both of which had
to be recognized. He noted that men in groups are bound together
by slogans and habits and achieve a certain personality which has some-
thing one might call a subconscious mind. He had, however, no doc-
trinaire belief of the reality of what the psychologist calls the sub-
conscious. He claimed only that it offered a pretty good platform
for making observations which could not be made from a platform
representing the attitude of respect and reverence which one must take
before a court. He never denied the utility of legal concepts, or the
necessity of using them when one appeared on the solemn judicial stage.
He never denied that it was the function of the law school to teach that
language. He asserted only that there was room for two sciences,
one a science of law to be used within the little dramatic universe of
the law and the other a science about law which was useful not on the
judicial stage but in the conference room of the diagnostician of social
institutions.
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He found that in our present thinking the science about law was dis-
cussed only in camera. It was the property of unscrupulous people,
because when used by respectable persons it created spiritual conflicts
between their ideals and practical necessities. Professor Robinson noted
that this attitude had the effect of removing from the field of practical
effectiveness in government many tolerant and respectable people. He
noted that it compelled them to drop the reins of power and turn the
real techniques of government over to a sub rosa class called politicians.
He had faith in a future science about law which actually concerned
the techniques of human organizations. He thought that it could be
studied better if we could only get a respectable place for it in our insti-
tutions of learning. But he did not claim that.all law subjects should
be taught from that platform. There is room in the law for romance
and oratory and logk, as well as for objective diagnosis, and he merely
sought a place for that diagnosis among these other techniques.
Professor Robinson realized the truth of Alvin Johnson's remark
that heretofore the union of the legal and social sciences had been a
beautiful example of cross-sterilization. He put his finger on the diffi-
culty. From an objective point of view law and economics are parts
of the folklore of the people. He therefore wanted to observe them as
an anthropologist observes folklore. To observe them in this way he
had to take the point of view that neither law nor economics had any
separate field of its own and that he was a student of the operation of
human institutions which used on different occasions the language of
each of these sciences. He did not think that there were separate "legal
aspects" and "economic aspects" to a problem. He thought that they
were only different attitudes which men took toward the same set of
events on different occasions.
Nor was Professor Robinson caught in that set of rigid classifica-
tions which makes up so much of the literature of psychology and psy-
chiatry. Indeed, when he first began to read about the "causes of action"
of common law pleading, he said that the similarity between these "causes
of action" and the classifications of psychiatry was most startling. He
told me that much psychiatric diagnosis consists in determining whether
schizophrenia "lies" in the same way that lawyers determine whether
"trespass on the case lies." The psychologist observing legal institutions,
he thought, had no right to assume that his training through observing
individuals in clinics gave him any special skill in observing legal insti-
tutions. Skill in observation of one sort of phenomenon does not mean
skill in the observation of another sort. Therefore, the observer of legal
institutions should be one who had experience with their activities. All
the psychologist could contribute to the observation of legal institutions
was a point of view. And the greatest light which that point of view
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could give would be to remove that feeling of moral indignation or
devotion to unattainable ideals which prevents legal scholars from seeing
what is under their noses. For the purposes of practical clarity he con-
sidered that the slogan "Be an adult and abandon your infantilisms"
was a good substitute for the older slogan "Be good and do not sin,"
because it enabled us in observing human activity to break the shackles
of many of the preconceptions of the past. He knew, however, that no
principle or slogan could be ridden too far. He agreed thoroughly with
that brilliant epigram of Harry Stack Sullivan of Chicago: "And now
when you have ceased to care for adventure, when you have forgotten
romance, when the only things worth while to you are prestige and
income, then you have grown up, then you have become an adult."
Professor Robinson never expected the human race to grow up, any
more than the realistic priests of the middle ages ever thought that the
human race was going to cease to sin. As an observer he was studying
the effect of the psychological compulsions which form institutions on
the conduct of those institutions. He saw in the law an unexplored mine
of such psychological material. He insisted that the lawyers themselves,
because of their great familiarity with the legal organization, would
make the best legal psychologists if only they could be won over to
a new point of view. That new point of view did not involve abandon-
ing the proverbs, parables and precepts of the law. It meant only that
the lawyer should think differently about the law when he was on the
solemn judicial stage than when he was off it.
One very competent legal scholar, Professor Mechem of Iowa, called
his point of view "the jurisprudence of despair." 2 It made many scholars
like Professor Mechem unhappy to think that it was necessary to be
practical about such sacred things as legal ideals and logic, and to regard
them as symptoms rather than as truths. It was a natural reaction
which may be compared to the reaction of the ethical philosophers at
the beginning of the century toward psychoanalytical descriptions of
"love" and "honesty." They felt their ethical world crumbling, just
as Professor Mechem felt his jurisprudential world crumbling under
the impact of an objective analysis. And yet Professor Robinson often
observed that the legal scholars had nothing to fear. People fall in love
as readily after Freud as before. In the same way, they can continue
to reverence judicial institutions in spite of the fact that they understand
them. The dramatist and the diagnostician have roles which are separate
and apart. Once diagnosis becomes a recognized technique, the orator
and the dramatist will find that their place in the law is still undisturbed.
Professor Robinson believed that power over human activities could be
acquired by objective understanding, just as power in the diagnosis and
2. Mechem, The Jurispndence of Despair (1936) 21 IowA L. REv. 669.
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cure of maladjusted personality had been acquired with that point of
view.
No one will ever know what Professor Robinson might have accom-
plished had he lived. I can give only my own appraisal: Professor Robin-
son was one of the really great minds of his generation, and the con-
tribution which he was about to make would have placed his name in
the very forefront of modern jurisprudence.
